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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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I.

FIRST AMENDMENT

MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR THE DEPORTATION OF ALIENS WHO ADVOCATE WORLD COMMUNISM VIOLATE

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989)
THE FIRST AMENDMENT,

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) commenced deportation proceedings against eight aliens in 1987 under the McCarranWalter Act, sections 241(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), and (H). The Government claimed the plaintiffs should be deported because of their membership in or affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP), an organization that advocates the economic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism. The INS later
abandoned the proceeding on these charges. The Government subsequently brought McCarran-Walter Act charges against two of the plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, however, and the remaining six were charged with nonideological immigration violations under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2) and
1251(a)(9) (1983). The plaintiffs challenged both the deportation proceedings and the constitutionality of the McCarran-Waher Act provisions. The district court found the matter nonjusticiable because (1) two
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of the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies with the
INS, and (2) a direct review of the statute was available through mandamus to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In 1988, the court of
appeals affirmed the decision and refused to review the statute until all
administrative remedies were exhausted.
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted standing to six of the aliens and to the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee to challenge the McCarran-Walter
Act provisions. The court held the provisions overbroad and thus violative of the first amendment. In reaching its decision, the court found that
aliens within the United States are protected by the first amendment
which is not restricted by the United States plenary immigration power.
The court reasoned that lowering the degree of first amendment protection for aliens in the deportation setting would seriously curtail the overall first amendment rights of aliens. The court reviewed the McCarranWalter Act provisions under the standard of Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969), which limits prohibitations on free speech only in instances that incite imminent lawless action. In applying this standard,
the McCarran-Walter Act provisions were found to proscribe activity
protected by the first amendment. The court stated that to write, publish,
display, or possess material advocating or teaching communism could not
be held to be the advocacy of imminent, unlawful action.
While recognizing the Government's interest in preserving national
security and promoting foreign policy in the exercise of its immigration
power, the court held that the Government must tailor the laws to limit
deportation to only those aliens who advocate imminent lawless action
and whose speech is likely to induce such action. Significance-This decision extends the protection of the first amendment to aliens who face
possible deportation, requiring Congress to tailor deportation laws to
conform to the traditional first amendment framework.
II. ACT OF

STATE DOCTRINE

PHILIPPINE ACTION AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS NOT
BARRED BY ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND INJUNCTION ALLOWED TO

of the Philippines v. Marcos,
862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
FREEZE ASSETS WORLDWIDE-Republic

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) brought suit against former president Ferdinand Marcos, his wife Imelda, and others in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982), and pendant claims. On Febru-
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ary 7, 1986, a special presidential election was held in the Philippines.
Following an overwhelming Marcos victory, the Philippine people protested in massive demonstrations. On February 25, 1986, Marcos and his
wife left the Philippines and moved to the United States, bringing with
them numerous crates filled with currency, jewels, precious metals, and
negotiable instruments. These crates were impounded by the United
States Customs Service. Other assets allegedly belonging to the Marcoses, or held for their benefit, were later discovered in other locations.
In its action for damages and injunctive relief, plaintiffs alleged that
the Marcoses had abused their authority and deprived the Philippine
Government and its citizens of $1.5 billion worth of converted property.
The Republic brought three RICO claims grounded on federal law and
eight pendant claims. The federal RICO claims charged the defendants
with (1) conducting a RICO enterprise; (2) investing funds produced by
racketeering into two "enterprises," a Beverly Hills property and two
Lloyds Bank accounts; and (3) conspiring to conduct a RICO enterprise
and invest the funds improperly.
The Republic also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the
Marcoses, or anyone acting on their behalf, from transferring any of the
disputed property. The district court held that RICO established a basis
for federal jurisdiction and the pendant claims entitled the Republic to
an injunction. The court granted the preliminary injunction based solely
on the pendant claims, finding a substantial likelihood that the Republic
would prevail and seeking to insure that the Republic would not be irreparably harmed by the moving of the Marcoses' assets.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the district court had jurisdiction to
entertain the plaintiffs' RICO claims; and (2) the action was barred by
the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine, or both, because
United States courts lack judicially manageable standards to review the
legality of actions of a foreign dictator under a reign of martial law.
After a rehearing en banc, the court of appeals, held: Reversed. The
court affirmed the district court's ruling and held that: (1) the district
court had jurisdiction over the RICO claims; (2) the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the pendant claims; (3) the suit was not
barred under the act of state or political question doctrines; and (4) the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary
injunction.
Judges Shroeder and Amby, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed under the RICO
claims, but disagreed that an injunction worldwide in scope should be
allowed since pendant jurisdiction over claims to all the Marcoses' assets
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had not yet been established. Judge Fletcher, concurring specially in
Judge Schroeder's opinion, disagreed with both the minority's limited
view of pendant jurisdiction and the majority's expansive view and determined that the scope of injunction should be reconsidered. Significance-In this decision, the court did not allowed the act of state doctrine to bar a suit against a former foreign sovereign and permitted
injunctive relief which is unprecedented in its worldwide application.
III.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITES ACT OF

1976 PROVIDES THE

SOLE BASIS FOR OBTAINING JURSIDICTION OVER A FOREIGN STATE,

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683
(1989).
On June 8, 1982, an Argentinian military plane attacked a Liberianowned and leased shipping vessel en route from the Virgin Islands to
Alaska. The bombing occurred during the Falkland Islands dispute between Argentina and Great Britain. After unsuccessfully attempting to
gain recovery from the Argentine Government for the extensive damage
to the ship, the plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs based their claims
on the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1976), and general
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1966).
The district court held that the claims did not come within the jurisdictional grant of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-11 (West 1973), and thus dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the case in a widely publicized opinion, holding that the
district court had jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute because the
action was based in tort and alleged a violation of international law. The
court of appeals determined that the FSIA was not exclusive and did not
preclude the use of remedies previously existing in the federal courts for
violations of international law.
The Supreme Court Held: Reversed. The FSIA is the sole basis of
jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States courts and the district
court properly dismissed the action. The Court determined that the
FSIA entitled foreign sovereigns to complete immunity from suit in the
courts of the United States unless the specific facts came under one of the
five enumerated immunity exceptions. The specific facts presented by the
plaintiffs in the instant case did not fit within any of these named exceptions. The Court stated that because Congress chose to protect specific
rights under international law by creating exceptions to foreign sovereign
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immunity, the otherwise absolute immunity contemplated in the FSIA
applied to all other areas of international dispute, including claims under
the Alien Tort Statute. The Court determined that the clear and express
language in the FSIA made it unnecessary for Congress to amend all
other general subject matter statutes to include immunity for foreign
sovereigns.
In addressing the specific factual allegations that the plaintiffs claimed
put them within at least one of the exceptions to the FSIA, the Court
held that the exceptions were misapplied by the plaintiffs. The Court
found that the event did not take place even arguably within boundaries
of the United States; therefore, the exception for noncommercial torts
occurring in the United States was inapplicable. Similarly, the Court
held that any international agreements signed by the Argentine Government and in effect at the time of enactment of the FSIA did not create a
private right of action outside the provisions of the FSIA. Significance This decision clearly establishes that jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign
may be obtained only if the facts of the plaintiffs' claim satisfy one of the
narrow exceptions to immunity set forth in the FSIA.
IV.

IMMIGRATION

ASLYUM APPLICANT WHO FAILS TO APPEAR AT ASYLUM HEARING
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

CAN

BE

HELD

TO

HAVE

ABANDONED

Reyes-Arias v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 866
F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
CLAIM,

Upon the institution of deportation proceedings, the petitioner, a native of El Salvador, sought asylum by claiming that leftist guerrillas had
killed his wife and sought to kill him. The petitioner failed to appear at
his initial asylum hearing and also at the second hearing after continuance due to his absence from the first hearing. His counsel appeared at
both hearings. At the second hearing the immigration judge denied the
petitioners application for asylum, and on appeal, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals refused to reopen the case because the petitioner had
failed to appear without adequate justification.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held on direct appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), that even though every claimant is entitled to a hearing on an
asylum claim, nothing in the immigration statute prevents the hearing
judge from dismissing the claim if the claimant does not appear. The
court held that the judge dismissed the claim in the instant case for failure to prosecute, which indicated that the petitioner had decided to abandon his asylum claim. The court also held that the petititioner's alleged
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lack of familiarity with the English language did not excuse actual
knowledge of scheduled hearings or that his presence would be required.
The court held that because his counsel was present, the petitioner
had the capacity to know when the hearings were scheduled. The court
also noted that the determination of the BIA that the petitioner did not
furnish adequate justification for his failure to appear, could only be
overturned for an abuse of discretion. The court held the facts did not
indicate an abuse of discretion because the BIA was simply following
established procedures. The court further held that allowing aliens to
circumvent the BIA proceedings by bringing suit in federal court would
introduce a great deal of uncertainty and a lack of finality into deportation procedures. Significance - An immigration judge has the discretion
to determine that a deportee who fails to appear at an asylum hearing
without justification has abandoned his claim for asylum.

